We study the problem of allocating a set of indivisible goods to multiple agents. Recent work [Bouveret and Lang, 2011] focused on allocating goods in a sequential way, and studied what is the "best" sequence of agents to pick objects based on utilitarian or egalitarian criterion. In this paper, we propose a parallel elicitation-free protocol for allocating indivisible goods. In every round of the allocation process, some agents will be selected (according to some policy) to report their preferred objects among those that remain, and every reported object will be allocated randomly to an agent reporting it. Empirical comparison between the parallel protocol (applying a simple selection policy) and the sequential protocol (applying the optimal sequence) reveals that our proposed protocol is promising. We also address strategical issues.
Introduction
How to allocate resources among multiple agents in an efficient, effective, and fair way is one of the most important sustainability problems. Recently it has become an emerging research topic in AI. Many centralized approaches to allocating indivisible goods have been proposed (e.g., in [Cramton et al., 2006] ). In these approaches, agents are required to fully reveal their preferences to some central authority (which computes the final allocation) and pay for the resources allocated to them at some prices. However, there are some drawbacks and limitations of these approaches:
• the elicitation process and the winner determination algorithm can be very expensive; • agents have to reveal their full preferences, which they might be reluctant to do (sometimes an elicitation process is unwelcome); • in many real world situations (e.g., assigning courses to students [Kalinowski et al., 2012; Budish and Cantillon, 2012] , and providing employment training opportunities to unemployed), resources must be allocated free and monetary side payments [Chevaleyre et al., 2010] are impossible or unwelcome.
So it is important to design a decentralized elicitation-free protocol for allocating indivisible goods. [Brams et al., 2012] adapted a cake-cutting protocol (a typical decentralized approach for the allocation of divisible goods [Chen et al., 2010] ) to the allocation of indivisible goods. However, the protocol is typically designed for the cases when there are only two agents. [Bouveret and Lang, 2011 ] studied a sequential elicitation-free protocol. By applying this protocol, any number of objects can be allocated to any number of agents. The sequential protocol is parameterized by a sequential policy (i.e., a sequence of agents). Agents take turns to pick objects according to the sequence when the allocation process begins.
In this paper, we define and study a parallel elicitation-free protocol for allocating indivisible goods to multiple agents. According to this protocol, a parallel policy (i.e., an agent selection policy) has to be defined before the public allocation process can begin. At each stage of the allocation process, some agents will be selected (according to the parallel policy) to publicly report their preferred objects among those that remain, and every reported object will be allocated to an agent reporting it. If an object is reported by more than one agent, then the agents reporting it draw lots and the winner could get it. We give a general definition of parallel policies, which can consider the allocation history that had happened; and provide eight different criteria to measure the social welfare induced by parallel policies.
In fact, any sequential policy applied in the sequential protocol is in a specific class of parallel policies that are sensitive to identities. The social welfare criteria considered in [Bouveret and Lang, 2011] and [Kalinowski et al., 2012] are three of the eight criteria proposed in our paper. We introduce two simple parallel policies (i.e., ̟ A and ̟ L ), which are insensitive to identities; and compare ̟ A and the optimal sequential policies (for small numbers of objects and agents) with respect to the three social welfare criteria. The results show that the parallel protocol is promising because ̟ A outperforms the optimal sequential policies in most cases.
We further consider strategical issues under ̟ A . We show that an agent who knows the preferences of other agents can find in polynomial time whether she has a strategy for getting a given set of objects regardless of uncertainty arising from lottery. We also show that if the scoring function of the manipulator is lexicographic, computing an optimal strategy in the sense of pessimism is polynomial.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows: Section 2 briefly reviews the basics of the sequential protocol. Section 3 presents the parallel protocol and introduces the two specific parallel policies (i.e., ̟ A and ̟ L ). Section 4 compares ̟ A and sequential policies with respect to several social welfare criteria. Section 5 considers strategical issues under ̟ A . Section 6 summarizes the contributions of this work and discusses future work.
Preliminaries
A set of m indivisible objects O = {o 1 , . . . , o m } need to be allocated free to a set of n agents N = {1, 2, . . . , n}. It is supposed that m ≥ n and all agents have strict preferences. ≻ i denotes agent i's ordinal preference (which is a total strict order) over O, and rank i (o) ∈ {1, . . . , m} denotes the rank of object o in ≻ i . A profile R consists of a collection of rankings, one for each agent: R = ≻ 1 , . . . , ≻ n ; P rof (O, N ) denotes the set of possible profiles under O and N . In the following discussion, if not specified, we only consider full independence case, where all preference orderings are equally probable (i.e., P r(
O , and o ∈ O, it is assumed that:
and
, where g is a non-increasing function from {1, . . . , m} to R + .
g is called the scoring function. g is convex if g(x) − g(x + 1) ≥ g(y) − g(y + 1) holds for any x ≤ y. In this paper, we focus on two prototypical convex scoring functions (let k ∈ {1, . . . , m}): (Borda) g B (k) = m−k+1, and (lexicographic) g L (k) = 2 m−k . In the sequential protocol, agents take turns to pick objects according to a sequential policy π ∈ N m . π(i) denotes the i th agent designated by π. Given π and a profile R = ≻ 1 , . . . , ≻ n , if all the agents act truthfully, then the corresponding allocation history h
Given a scoring function g, agent i's utility at π and R (i.e., u i (π, R)) and i's expected utility at π (i.e., u * i (π)) are:
where
Given an aggregation function F (which is a symmetric, non-decreasing function from (R + ) n to R + ), the expected social welfare of a sequential policy π is defined as:
[Bouveret and Lang, 2011] considered two typical aggregation functions which correspond to the utilitarian criterion F u (u 1 , . . . , u n ) = n i=1 u i and the Rawlsian egalitarian criterion F e (u 1 , . . . , u n ) = min{u i |1 ≤ i ≤ n}. They also showed that, strict alternation (i.e., 12 . . . n12 . . . n . . .) is optimal for O, N , g B , F u when m ≤ 12 and n = 2, and m ≤ 10 and n = 3. But they did not know whether this is true for every m and n.
The following example is modified from the one given in [Bouveret and Lang, 2011] . It illustrates the notions introduced in this section and will be used throughout the paper.
Example 1 Let m = 5, n = 3, and π = 12332. 
is 5, 9, 7 under gB, and 16, 24, 12 under gL.
Parallel Protocol and Policies
Now we introduce a parallel protocol for allocating indivisible goods. At each stage t of the allocating process, there is a designated set of agents N t ⊆ N s.t. each i ∈ N t reports an object (her preferred object among those that remain). If object o is reported by only one agent then it is allocated to the agent, otherwise the agents demanding o draw lots 1 for the right to get o.
The protocol is parameterized by a parallel policy. Formally, a parallel policy is a function ̟ : (2
(where for every 1 ≤ l ≤ k, N l is the set of agents reporting at stage l, and N ′ l ⊂ N l is the set of agents losing some lottery at stage l), ̟ designates the set of agents reporting at stage k + 1. An allocation history induced by ̟ is in the form of
is the set of objects reported by some i ∈ N k , and for every
the demand situation at k, and STOP is called the termination situation.
Given a parallel policy ̟ and a profile R = ≻ 1 , . . . , ≻ n , if all the agents act truthfully, the set of possible histories can be represented as an allocation structure S ̟ R = V, E s.t. V and E are the minimal sets satisfying the following rules:
• STOP ∈ V, and if there exists a history h = .
.
It is easy to find that S ̟ R is acyclic, and O, D is the root. Since the allocation process from some demand situation v ∈ V is nondeterministic in general, each rational agent i is often concerned with her expected utilityû i (v) and the minimal utility u i (v) that she can get regardless of uncertainty. Formally, given a scoring function g,
are called agent i's expected utility and minimum utility at ̟ and R, respectively, where v is the root of S ̟ R . Each agent i ∈ N can evaluate a given parallel policy ̟ according to 4 values, i.e., v i (y, z, ̟) where:
• y, z ∈ {u,e},
The social welfare induced by ̟ (i.e., sw(x, y, z, ̟)) can be measured by the 8 possible orderings over 3 elements taken from {u,e}. Formally, x, y, z ∈ {u,e},
, and sw(e, y, z, ̟) = min{v i (y, z, ̟)|1 ≤ i ≤ n} 3 . Any sequential policy π can be seen as a parallel policy ̟ π s.t. ̟ π (ǫ) = π(1) and ̟ π (σ k ) = π(k + 1) for every 1 ≤ k < m, where σ k = {π(1)}, ∅ , . . . , {π(k)}, ∅ . For every profile R, there is only one possible history in S ̟π R . Sô
In this paper, we introduce two specific parallel policies: all-reporting ̟ A , where all the agents report at every stage, 3 Intuitively, u and e denote the utilitarian principle and the egalitarian principle in social welfare aggregation, respectively. 
̟ L guarantees that every agent can get m n objects at least. So in the eyes of pessimists, it may be a better choice than ̟ A .
Note that neither ̟ A nor ̟ L mentions identities of agents. We called this kind of parallel policies are insensitive to identities. We can get Lemma 1 directly.
Lemma 1 Let parallel policy ̟ be insensitive to identities. Then for every y, z ∈ {u,e}, and i, j ∈ N , we have v i (y, z, ̟) = v j (y, z, ̟), and sw(u, y, z, ̟) = n · v i (y, z, ̟) = n · sw(e, y, z, ̟). Figure   1 shows the allocation structures of ̟A and ̟L, where (let 1 ≤ p ≤ 3, 1 ≤ q ≤ 5, and ud denote the undefined value):
Example 2 Consider the situation depicted in Example 1.
• dp ∈ (Op) |N | s.t. dp[i] = Dp(i) for every i ∈ N , i.e., d1 = 1, 4, 1 , d2 = 2, 2, 3 , and d3 = 5, 5, 5 ; and [Bouveret and Lang, 2011] studied what are the sequential policies maximizing social welfare. They considered a utilitarian principle and an egalitarian principle, in which the social welfare induced by a sequential policy π is measured by the values of sw(u,u,u, ̟ π ) and sw(e,u,u, ̟ π ), respectively. They computed the optimal sequential policies for small numbers of objects and agents using an exhaustive search algorithm, and further conjectured that the problem of finding an optimal sequential policy is NP-hard. It has been proved that the alternating policy (i.e., 1212 . . .) maximizes the value of sw(u,u,u, ̟ π ) for two agents under Borda scoring function [Kalinowski et al., 2013a] . However, the general problem (i.e., finding a sequential policy maximizing the value of sw(u,u,u, ̟ π ) and sw(e,u,u, ̟ π ), for more than two agents, or under other scoring functions) is still open.
Comparison
On another hand, parallel policy ̟ A (i.e., all-reporting) is very natural and simple, and does not have costly procedures like finding optimal sequence in sequential protocol. By applying ̟ A , every agent has a chance to get a remaining object in every round of the parallel allocation process. But we don't know if sw(u,u,u, ̟ A ) and sw(e,u,u, ̟ A ) can be computed in polynomial time. We conjecture it's much harder than computing sw(u,u,u, ̟ π ) and sw(e,u,u, ̟ π ), because complications arise not only from uncertainty over profiles but from uncertainty over lots.
In this section, we will compare the parallel protocol (applying ̟ A ) and the sequential protocol (applying the optimal sequential policies) with respect to several social welfare criteria. We demonstrate experimentally that in most cases, ̟ A is better than sequential policies. To sum up, the parallel protocol is promising.
We first compare ̟ A and sequential policies with respect to the utilitarian criterion considered by Bouveret and Lang, which are sw(u,u,u, ̟ A ) and sw(u,u,u, ̟ π ), respectively. For small numbers of objects and agents (i.e., m and n), we compute the optimal sequential policies (denoted by π * ) and sw(u,u,u, ̟ π * ) by use of the tool provided by Bouveret and Lang (http:// recherche.noiraudes.net/en/sequences.php), and compute sw(u,u,u, ̟ A ) by use of an exhaustive method (on a PC Intel(R) Core(TM) i5-3570K @3.4Ghz). The time required to compute sw(u,u,u, ̟ A ) grows dramatically in Table 3 : π * , sw(e, u, u, ̟ π * ), and sw(e, u, u, Table 4 : π * , sw(e, u, u, ̟ π * ), and sw(e, u, u, the number n of agents and in the number m of objects. We find that with n = 3 and m = 8 the computation of sw(u,u,u, ̟ A ) requires about 8 minutes, but sw(u,u,u, ̟ A ) can not be computed in 12 hours with n = 3 and m = 9. The results under Borda and Lexicographic scoring functions (i.e., g B and g L ) are shown in Table 1 and Table 2 4 , respectively. From Table 1 and Table 2 , we can get that when n = 2 and 10 ≥ m ≥ 4, the values of π * and ̟ A are equal; however, when n > 2, the values of ̟ A are strictly greater than those of π * . These results suggest that, for small numbers of agents and objects, we could have a better utilitarian social welfare if we apply ̟ A rather than ̟ π * . We conjecture that it is not a coincidence, but we could not find a proof.
Conjecture 1
Under any convex scoring function g and for any number m ≥ n of objects, sw(u, u, u, ̟ π * ) = sw(u, u, u, ̟ A ) when n = 2, and sw (u, u, u 
We also compare ̟ A and sequential policies with respect to the egalitarian criterion considered by Bouveret and Lang. The results under g B and g L are shown in Table 3 and Table 4 , respectively. We find that the values of ̟ A are strictly greater than those of π * in all the test cases. In fact, ̟ A is insensitive to identities. So according to Lemma 1, sw(e, u, u, ̟ A ) = 1/n · sw(u, u, u, ̟ A ), which is definitely the fairest way to divide sw(u, u, u, ̟ A ). However, sequential policies are sensitive to identities. From Conjecture 1, we further conjecture that ̟ A will always be a better choice than any sequential policy for the balance of utilitarianism and egalitarianism.
Conjecture 2 Under any convex scoring function g, for any number n of agents and any number m ≥ n of objects, sw(e, u, u, ̟ π * ) < sw(e, u, u, ̟ A ).
[ Kalinowski et al., 2012] considered a different egalitarian principle in which the social welfare induced by a sequential policy π is measured by the value of sw(u,e,u, ̟ π ). They also computed the optimal sequential policies (denoted by π * ) under g B when n = 2 and p ≤ 8. We compute the values of sw(u, e, u, ̟ π * ) and sw(u, e, u, ̟ A ) by use of an exhaustive method. The result is shown in Table 5 . Again, ̟ A outperforms sequential policies in all the test cases.
Strategical Issues under ̟ A
In this section, we will discuss strategical issues under allreporting policy ̟ A , which is one of the simplest parallel policies that are insensitive to identities. As most collective decision mechanisms, ̟ A is not strategyproof. See Example 2. If all the agents play sincerely, i.e., report their preferred object at each stage, thenû 1 (̟ A , R) = 1 2 g(1) + 1 2 g(2) + 1 3 g(5) and u 1 (̟ A , R) = 0. Suppose 1 is a pessimist and believes that she cannot win any lottery. Then she is concerned only with the utility she can get regardless of uncertainty. If 1 knows other agents' preferences and plays strategically, then she reports o 2 first and she can get g(2) units of utility at least, which is better than 0 = u 1 (̟ A , R).
Someone may want to study the impact of strategic behavior on the complete-information extensive-form game of such parallel allocation procedures 5 . However, it is supposed that the environment matches decentralized elicitationfree protocols' application motivation. That is to say, we suppose that it is hard to learn self-interested agents' preferences in advance 6 . So we accept the assumption made in [Bouveret and Lang, 2011] , i.e., all agents but the only one manipulator act truthfully. In the following discussion, without loss of generality, let 1 be the manipulator that knows the rankings of the other agents (i.e., ≻ 2 , . . . , ≻ n ), and
Under ̟ A , a strategy for agent 1 is a sequence of objects
That is to say, τ specifies which object 1 should report at any stage 1 ≤ t ≤ T . Some strategies may fail because some object that 1 intends to report has already been allocated. We say strategy τ is well-defined with respect 5 In [Kalinowski et al., 2013b] , the allocation procedure applying the sequential protocol, is viewed as a finite repeated game with perfect information, where all agents act strategically. 6 In the environments where every agent can learn other agent's preferences in advance, centralized allocation methods need to be taken into consideration instead. Because in these cases, the prerequisite to the protection of private preferences is ruined.
to ≻ 2 , . . . , ≻ n if at any stage t ∈ {1, . . . , T }, object o ′ t is still available, and there is no object available after stage T .
A manipulation problem M (for agent 1) consists of ≻ 2 , . . . , ≻ n , and a target set of objects S ⊆ O. A well-defined strategy τ is successful for M if, assuming the agents 2 to n act sincerely, τ ensures that agent 1 gets all objects in S. Solving M consists in determining whether there exists a successful strategy. Below we show that the manipulation problem M can be solved in polynomial time. 
Obviously, for every o ∈ O, there exists one and only k ≥ 1 s.t. o ∈ S k ∪ O k . We denote by app S (o) the number k. 
Lemma 3 Let
S ′ ⊆ S ⊆ O, ρ S ′ = O ′ 1 , S 1 , O 1 , O ′ 2 ,
